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ABSTRACT
Zhang, Nan.

M.S., Department of Social and Applied Economics, Wright State University, 2008.

Carbon Trading System Analysis:

Schemes Selection, Permits Allocation and Auction Revenue

Distribution

The carbon trading system is one mechanism proposed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
and to solve global warming.

The key issues in adopting a carbon trading system include trading

schemes selection, emitting permits allocation, and auction revenue distribution.

This thesis

discusses these problems from a Neoinstitutionalist perspective, and conducts an analysis under
the socio-ecosystem framework rather than the restricted market system analysis.

It is found that

the most important issue is to set an appropriate cap for the total allowed emission amount through
recognizing the socio-ecosystem value.

The absolute cap-and-trade system is supported since it

can decrease the emissions to the targeted level where the ecosystem sustains.

By including

social cost in the analysis, it becomes clear that the auction method should be adopted to allocate
emission permits.

The thesis uses the property regimes theory and concludes that Barnes’s Sky

Trust should be established to allocate auction revenues.
approach is recommended for managing the atmosphere.

In addition, Swaney’s co-management
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the last 10,000 years we have been living in a remarkably stable climate that has allowed
the whole of human development to take place.

In all that time, through the mediaeval warming

and the Little Ice Age, there was only a variation of 1°C.
changes of between 2°C and 6°C.
temperatures.

Now we see the potential for sudden

We just don’t know what the world is like at those

We are climbing rapidly out of mankind’s safe zone into new territory, and we

have no idea if we can live in it.
—Robert Corell, Arctic scientist and IPCC member; The Guardian 5 October 2007
Climate models from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as
models from other scientific organizations, indicated that global concentrations of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) increased steadily over the past 100 years.

Although arguments continued as to

whether GHGs are causes of global climate change, significant impacts of climate change existed,
including increasing sea levels; more severe droughts and floods, unusual weather patterns
regarding hurricanes and blizzards, and increasing global temperatures.

The United Kingdom

Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution concluded that “Climate change is an enormous
challenge ... threatening generations to come”. [RCEP, 2000, p. 9]

Nearly all countries recognize the severe impact of climate change— 192 of the 195 countries
signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to “prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” [UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2].
UNFCCC was targeted to encourage the industrialized countries to stabilize their GHGs emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol that linked to UNFCCC was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries committed to reduce GHGs emissions by about

1

5% from 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012.

Until 2008, 183 parties of UNFCCC members

have ratified the Kyoto Protocol [UNFCC, 2008].

Those participating countries have the

obligation to reduce their emissions by different levels so the overall goal in the Kyoto Protocol
can be achieved.

Among various greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is the most significant component that
contributes to global warming because of the wide use of fossil fuels.

It contributes about 60%

of the human-enhanced greenhouse gas emissions [UNEP, 2008].

Mauna Loa Observatory * Hawaii
Monthly Average Carbon Dioxide Concentration
Date from Scripps C 0 2 Program

Last updated July 2008

Year

Figure 1 The Keeling Curve, showing the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

Charles Keeling measured the C02 concentration in the atmosphere on top of Mauna Loa in
Hawaii for many years.

Figure 1 summarized the carbon dioxide concentration from 1958 to

2008 [Scripps Carbon Dioxide Program, 2008].

The figure showed a clear upward trend with

about 23 percent increase of accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere during these
years1.

Figure 2 showed carbon dioxide concentration and global temperature over the past 400,000
years [Petit et al, 1989].

Clearly, a strong correlation exists between them.
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Figure 2 Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Concentrations and Atmospheric Temperature over the
Past 400,000 years.

Due to carbon dioxide’s major contribution to climate change, reduction of carbon dioxide is
potentially the most effective solution to approach the issue of global warming.

The substitution

of fossil fuel with renewable energy such as solar and wind could significantly decrease carbon
dioxide emissions since fossil fuel is both a significant energy source for current economies and a
major carbon dioxide emission source.

For companies, the adoption of more costly technologies

1 The reason for the variation of carbon dioxide accumulation within a year is that there are more
trees to absorb carbon dioxide in summer than in winter.
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increases production costs and makes their products more expensive and less competitive in the
marketplace. Currently, no incentive exists for companies and individuals to use renewable energy
sources because the social cost2 of emitting carbon dioxide is not considered in private decision
making.

To reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the issue becomes how to include the social cost of

carbon dioxide emissions into the firm’s for-profit3 production cost and therefore, decision
making.

Carbon trading, also referred to as “cap-and-trade”, and carbon tax are two existing practices
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by including the carbon dioxide emissions into the production
cost.

The permission to emit carbon dioxide is treated as a commodity in the cap-and-trade

market.

The price to emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere is determined by the market

through the trading of emitting permits among participating parties.

The total carbon dioxide

emissions that can be emitted are fixed at a threshold level because the total amount of emitting
permits is set by the government or an independent market operator.

A company must own a

permit to release carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere; otherwise, it will be penalized.

Carbon emission trading is a hot topic.

The cap-and-trade system was incorporated into

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and already was adopted in Europe.

It was

also proposed by 2008 presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain in the United
States [CFR, 2008].

Edmonds [1999] suggested that a carbon trading system should be favored

because it provided market flexibility in determining where it was the cheapest way to reduce

2 Social Cost refers to the harmful consequences and damages which third party or communities suffer as a result
of productive processes and for which private entrepreneurs does not account for, see detailed discussion at Section
2 .2 .2 .

3 For profit means individual company in the market system has the incentive to minimize its individual cost so as
to maximize its profit.
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carbon dioxide emissions.

The key issues in adopting the cap-and-trade system include 1) how

the cap should be set for every year; 2) to what extent the government should be involved, and
who administrates the carbon trading market; 3) which trading scheme should be chosen; 4) how
to initially allocate emission permits— auction or grandfathering (offer free permits to polluting
companies); and 5) how the revenues associated with permits auctions should be distributed.

Most of the current economic research focused on analyzing the different trading schemes,
permits allocation and permits auctions revenue distribution via the market system.

The present

thesis discusses the problems from a Neoinstitutionalist perspective and conducts the analysis
under the socio-ecosystem framework rather than the restricted market system analysis.

Influenced by K. William Kapp, Thorstein Veblen and Karl Polanyi, Swaney, published his
Elements of a Neoinstitutional Environmental Economics [1987]. Swaney considered the social
system as “evolutionary, organic and holistic” [p. 1747].

He proposed to analyze environmental

problems with ecology ethics under a holistic system where political power and economic power
mix with market forces.

The concept of “coevolutionary sustainability” was then introduced,

under which both the social costs and cost shifting were considered.

He further argued that

coevolutionary sustainability should be used as a core principle to evaluate development paths or
technological changes.

Following the idea of incorporating social cost from the Neoinstitutionalist School, this thesis
argues that the auction method should be used to allocate emission permits, and claims that the
most important issue involved with a carbon trading system is to set an appropriate cap for the
total emission amount.

To our best knowledge, these issues were skipped and assumed to be
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known when previous researchers conducted studies.

This thesis further discusses the

distribution of permits auctions revenue by using property regimes theory4.

Overall, this thesis analyzes the issues in adopting a carbon trading system under the
socio-ecosystem framework and evaluates the extent to which a trading system can potentially
alleviate the urgency of global warming.

One primary question I seek to answer: Will a carbon

trading system be sufficient to solve global warming or should it just postpone the transition to
renewable energy sources?

4 Property Regimes Theory was developed by Bromley. Bromley [1991] used “proPerty regimes” to define the
social relation that involves property holders, benefit streams and duty buyers. Bromley [1991] classified three
general types of property regimes including private property, state property and common property. See the
detailed discussion at Section 2.2.5.
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II.BACKGROUND
This chapter summarizes the history of emission trading systems and types of trading
schemes, compares auctioning and grandfathering emitting permits, and introduces the issue of
distributing permits auctions revenue.

Predominantly, these topics have been discussed within

the restricted market framework with little consideration of the interlinkages among economic,
social and ecological systems.

To analyze the issues associated with an emission trading system

under the socio-ecosystem framework, this chapter also explains the concepts broadly used in the
Neoinstitutionalist School, including discussion of market system versus socio-ecosystem, social
cost versus individual cost, cost shifting, methods of valuation, and property regimes for managing
open-access resources.

2.1.

Carbon Trading System

2.1.1. Emission Trading System Overview

The first large-scale, long-term emission trading scheme was established in 1995 in the
United States.

The Trading program basically arose under the Clean Air Act (1990) to reduce

sulfur dioxide (S 02) emissions and, consequently, acid rain. This trading program allowed
polluting companies rather than the government to decide how and where to reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions in order to comply with the Clean Air Act.

7

Benkovic and Kruger [2001] claimed that

the S 0 2 program in the United States was very successful and United States reduced more than 4
million tons of S 0 2 since 1995.

2.1.2. Emission Trading Schema

Three different types of trading schemes were discussed by researchers [Kuik and Mulder,
2002]: 1) Absolute cap-and-trade system, where the total allowed emission quantity for a nation is
fixed by legislation.
atmosphere.
permits.

Companies have to own emission permits to release carbon dioxide into the

Companies are fined if they emit more emissions than the quantity allowed by the

2) Relative cap-and-trade system, where emissions are legislatively fixed per unit of

output or per unit of input, e.g., emissions per megawatt electricity produced or per ton of steel
produced; however, there is no cap on total emissions.

3) A combination of the absolute and

relative cap-and-trade system.

Kuik and Mulder [2002] compared and contrasted the three trading schemes to analyze their
pros and cons at the domestic level in the Netherlands.

They found several advantages for the

relative trading system compared to the absolute trading system.
provided continuing incentives for firms to reduce emissions.

The relative trading system

Also, arguably less negotiating

cost was required to implement the policy since agreements pertaining to energy-efficiency
standards among firms and governments already existed.
producers because it did not constrict their production scale.

The system was favored by the
The disadvantage of the relative

trading system over the absolute trading system was that total emissions reduction was not
guaranteed.

Since the total emission quantity is not capped, carbon emissions would increase

with an increase in total output due to economic development.

Disregarding the relative trading

system’s low effectiveness for reducing carbon emissions, Kuik and Mulder [2002] favored the
relative cap-and-trade system because it did not interfere with the market system.

They objected

to the adoption of an absolute cap-and-trade scheme and the mixed scheme and claimed that those
schemes have high administrative costs.

They argued for the adoption of the relative

cap-and-trade system along with other policies such as energy taxes to achieve additional emission
reductions in the Netherlands.

Gielen et al. [2002] used a simple partial equilibrium model to analyze the relative
cap-and-trade system.

Their analysis showed that the relative cap-and-trade system tended to

generate greater emissions at the industry level because of the larger output, although it could
generate the same emission reduction level as the absolute cap-and-trade system if the relative
cap-and-trade system had higher permit prices and levels of abatement. This implied that the
relative cap-and-trade system had less overall efficiency than the absolute cap-and-trade system to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions.

Overall, the relative cap-and-trade system cannot effectively reduce the total carbon dioxide
emissions by a sufficient amount to combat global warming.

The relative cap-and-trade system

is favored if stronger preference is held for the market system, thereby allowing companies more
freedom to emit carbon dioxide.

We have to recognize that companies’ freedom to emit carbon

dioxide is built on the degradation of the socio-ecosystem.
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2.1.3. Allocation of Emission Permits

In addition to choosing a trading scheme, one of the most important decisions in the emission
trading system is the choice of an emission permits allocation method.
considered: government auction and grandfathering.

Two alternatives were

In the government auction, the revenue

from auctioning emission permits is collected by the government.

The grandfathering allocation

distributes free permits to the current emission producers.

Historically, grandfathering was a popular practice of emission trading schemes. Two
arguments were made by the proponents of the grandfathering allocation: 1) current emitters had
the burden to reduce emissions in the future; 2) the gains from the free emission permits helped
companies to engage in the programs that could reduce emissions, and therefore minimized the
cost increase of their products.

One example of the grandfathering allocation method is the

sulfur dioxide trading system in the United States.

In the sulfur dioxide trading system, the

permits were given away free to those polluting utility companies based on their historical S 0 2
emission quantity in 1985.

Although utility companies were regulated by state public utility

commissions in the United States, no relevant guidance directed how the profit generated from
grandfathering permits should be treated at the beginning of the S 0 2 trading program. [Williams,
2008]

Without proper planning, grandfathering allocation can even generate negative impacts.
According to Sijm et al. [2005], too many emitting permits were allocated freely to the carbon
dioxide producers in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005.

The

grandfathering allocation brought substantial profit to the carbon dioxide emitters because those
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companies collected revenues by selling extra permits in the emission trading market.

Sijim et al.

[2005] calculated the windfall profits from grandfathering permits for companies who were
rewarded free permits in Germany and the Netherlands. Those windfall profits accounted for 9.6%
to 46% of those companies’ baseline profits in 2005.

The profits could ultimately benefit the

shareholders of emitting companies.

Cramton and Kerr [1998] favored government auction over grandfathering allocation on the
basis of three reasons.

First, government could use the revenues to decrease the distortion taxes

and then to increase economy efficiency.

Second, auctions could increase equality in the

economy by distributing auction revenues to the citizens.

Third, small producers and new parties

could gain fair access to the potential profitable emission permits.

Klassen et al. [2005] held

similar opinion and argued that auctions could increase both efficiency and equality by creating
price transparency.

Ekins [2001] explained the popularity of grandfathering with the political power of the
emitting companies.

The energy-intensive sectors usually were considered industrially important.

They would become losers in the auction system.

To avoid losing, they used lobbying power to

influence government’s decision to adopt the grandfathering method.

2.1.4. Auction Revenue Allocation

Barnes [2001] favored the common property ownership of the atmosphere in his book Who
Owns the Sky.

He treated the sky where the carbon dioxide was emitted as common goods to

which everyone on earth was entitled an equal share.
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Barnes’ analysis specifically discussed the

ownership of sky specifically in the United States.

He considered three potential owners of the

sky: private companies, the federal government, and citizens.

Although the proponents of

privatization of common goods argued that corporations would provide a quid pro quo service to
the public, the history of this type of privatization showed that the government usually just gave
away the valuable assets [Snider, 2007].

Also, Barnes [2001] argued that common properties

such as land, timber and spectrum managed by the government often were sold at far below
market value.

By studying the Alaska Permanent Fund, Barnes [2001] proposed the

establishment of the Sky Trust to manage the revenues that came from auctioning emission
permits.

The funds in the Alaska Permanent Fund come from the oil revenues generated from oil

wells on the land owned by Alaska.

Since those lands are common property of Alaska’s residents,

it was determined that 25% of those revenues were deposited into the Alaska Permanent Fund.
The fund is owned by Alaska’s residents, and each of them has an equal share and receives
dividends every year.

The proposed Sky Trust in the United States was similar to the Alaska Permanent Fund
except that it operates at the national level [Barnes, 2001].

First, the Congress or the trustees of

the Sky Trust decided how many emitting permits should be sold by considering the balance of
ecological sustainability and economic development, besides the actions taken by other countries
[Barnes, 2001].

Second, these permits were sold by auctions to companies and individuals who

had a need for or are interested in these permits.

A market for the permits was generated and

the price of the permits was determined in the market because the cap of the permits was fixed at a
lever lower than current carbon dioxide emissions.

Third, the revenue from the auction was

deposited in the trust and was paid out equally to every citizen in the nation.
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When the emitting

permits were auctioned every year, recycling revenues were generated for every citizen and they
can use the revenue to offset the higher living cost resulting from limiting carbon dioxide.
Barnes [2001] also proposed the establishment of a Transition Fund for a certain period to help
those who may lose their jobs (e.g., coal miners or truck drivers) because of the adoption of a
carbon trading system.

Barnes and Breslow [2003] summarized the following key advantages of the Sky Trust:
First, this allocation method achieved the efficiency of incentive-based regulation.

Second, the

Sky Trust recognized that the carbon-absorptive capacity of the atmosphere was common property
to which everyone was entitled and the natural wealth such as atmosphere and biodiversity should
be held collectively and distributed equally, and any entity that degraded the natural wealth had to
pay the price.

Third, the equal distribution of auction revenue from the Sky Trust increased

household income of the lower income class more than the higher income class.

Barnes and

Breslow [2003] used neoclassical cost-benefit analysis to study the distribution impact.

They

considered the cost as the increased price of fossil fuel and other goods and resources produced
with fossil fuel after the adoption of carbon-trading system.
allocated from auction revenue.

The benefit was the revenue

One drawback left by Barnes and Breslow is the benefit derived

from the ecosystem as a result of lower carbon emissions.

The distribution impact of a Sky Trust is analyzed for several nations.

In terms of U.S,

Barnes and Breslow [2003] found that the income of households in the lowest 10% would rise by
$354, or 5.1 percent and the income of households in the top 10% would fall by $1,378, or -0.9
percent.

Boyce and Riddle [2007] conducted a similar study.

They used an estimated price of $200

per metric ton of carbon (an emitting permit) that would achieve the goal to reduce U.S. carbon
dioxide emission by about 7 percent below the current level.

Their calculation showed that the

estimated cost per American household of median income would increase by $1,570 per year
because of the more expensive fossil fuels and increased price of other products.
revenues from the permit auctions were estimated to be about $200 billion.

Total annual

If the revenues were

distributed to every American citizen equally, the dividends received by the majority of the
households were more than what they paid as a result of higher fossil fuel prices.

Brenner et al. [2005] analyzed the distributional impact of a Sky Trust in China.

They

discovered the progressivity of auction revenue collection and distribution, and the huge
difference between rural and urban areas.
rural area of the United States.

The rural area of China was very different from the

The households in rural China had extremely low cash incomes

and expenditures. They acquired their 60 to 90 percentage of energy from biomass.
Consequently, auction revenue collection and distribution in China is progressive, and the net
effect of the Sky Trust had a larger impact on the distribution of income in China than in the
United States.

Brenner et al. [2005] estimated that the rural poverty in China would decline by

4.2%.

Ferjentsik and Ash [2007] analyzed the distribution impact for Hungarians if Hungary
adopted the Sky Trust in its carbon trading system.

Hungary joined the European Union (EU) in

2005 and its per capita income was about 60 percent of average EU per capita income [OECD,
2006].

Ferjentsik and Ash

[2007]

classified Hungary as “a small,

open-economy,

energy-importing middle-income country” [p. 4].

They found that revenues from auctioning the

emitting permits were almost flat compared to the Sky Trust distributing income.

Combining the

Sky Trust revenue recycling, Ferjentsik and Ash [2007] found that the net effect on income
distribution in Hungary was moderately progressive.

They found that the income of households

in the top 10% in Hungary would fall by $859, or 4.4 percent.

The income of households in the

lowest 10% in Hungary would rise by $498, or 11.4 percent.

The impacts on the income of the

median households would be small but positive.

Comparing the distribution analysis conducted in the three countries, one can conclude that
the same environmental policy generates different impacts.

In China, low income people benefit

more from the carbon trading system than those in the United States and Hungary.

This lends

support to the Neoinstituionalists’ argument that we must recognize the importance of
heterogeneity in institutional arrangements across cultures and geographical regions.

2.2.

Key Concepts in Neoinstitutional Economics

The literature review in the previous section focuses primarily on the carbon trading system
within market relations.
framework.

This thesis conducts the analysis under the Neoinstitutional economics

Original institutional economics included market relations as part of social relations.

Furthermore, Neoinsitutional economics included socio-ecological interconnectedness.

The

following sections discuss the concepts in Neoinstitutional economics which are fundamental to
this thesis.
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2.2.1. Market Economy Vs. Socio-ecosystem

Karl Polanyi [2001] discussed how the market economy was separated from the society and
became self-regulated in his book The Great Transformation.

He used the term self-regulation to

describe economic relations where all production was for sale on the market and all incomes were
derived from such sales.

Therefore, a self-regulating market institutionally separated the society

into economic and political spheres.

Labor and land became fictitious commodities and

components of the market economy since the nineteenth century.

The substance of society and

ecosystems were considered subordinate to the law of market.

Meanwhile, Polanyi [2001]

explained that society also reacted with protective countermoves to reduce the damage of the
market economy on society—the so-called double movement.

Swaney [1989] argued that viewing the market as a separate sphere apart from the
socio-ecosystem was broadly accepted in the status quo of economic and political power.
Polanyi [2001] termed this habit of thought “market mentality”.
ignorance of the social cost and ecological disturbance.

The consequence was the

Mounting evidence existed that

increased human well-being was realized at the expense of ecological stability [Swaney, 1986].

Neoinstituionalists viewed the market economy embedded in society and recognized the
interaction between social and natural systems and the complexity of natural systems and
humankind’s rapidly expanding power to break ecological chains. Currently, we know little about
interactions between social systems and ecosystems.

Since individuals might maximize their

own utility by shifting cost to others or the ecosystem, Neoinstitutionalists favored social and
ecological control over the market system to reduce unexpected negative impact on the global
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socio-ecosystem. [Swaney, 1987].

As discussed above, we must evaluate the public policy not

only via a market system but also via the socioecosystem framework.

2.2.2. Social Cost vs. Individual Cost

K. William Kapp [1950] employed the concept of “social cost” in The Social Costs of Private
Enterprise.

This term was used to describe all the hannful consequences and damages which

third persons or communities suffered as a result of productive processes and for which private
entrepreneurs were not easily held accountable.

Different from the traditional definition of social

cost as total social opportunity cost, Kapp [1950] defined social cost as the remaining part of
social opportunity cost after deducting the paid private costs.

This definition was also different

from Alfred Marshall’s externality concept which implied that the uncompensated social
opportunity cost was exceptional and incidental to the market economy.
cost” pervasive and systemic.

Kapp considered “social

Kapp [1970] stated that the externality concept was developed

under the economic theory that assumed the allocation, production, exchange and distribution
occurred in an essentially closed and autonomous economic sphere with only minor effects on
man’s natural and social environment.

On the other hand, Kapp [1970] argued that social cost

resulted directly and systematically from the market system, with harmful impacts on workers and
other people in addition to the environment.

Swaney [1989] also described social cost as

“n-party” effects, where multiple, often distant individuals or groups or societies or
human-supporting ecological systems are injured.

Thus, social cost is both an exogenous and

endogenous institutional structure because the market has a built-in tendency to generate
uncompensated effect to third parties and communities.
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2.2.3. Cost Shifting

Social cost is considered closely related to “cost-shifting by Kapp [1950].

His The Social

Costs of Private Enterprise [Kapp, 1950] contained a detailed study of the manner in which the
social cost produced by private companies was not counted in the companies’ business
expenditures and further shifted to third persons and the community.

Cost-shifting occurred

when business expenditures were reduced not by employing advanced production methods that
could benefit the overall society, but rather by avoiding outlays at the expense of workers, the
environment, or the community at large.

Individual cost was the cost for which entrepreneurs

were directly accountable in the market system.
minimize its cost so as to maximize its profit.

An individual firm had the incentive to

The firm that conducted such a cost shifting

benefited and maximized its profit, but society as a whole was damaged by the cost-shifting.
Swaney [1989] suggested that the damage might be particularly critical if this shift occurred in a
competitive environment where other companies had to either follow or exit.

As Kapp [1970]

argued, the realization of monetary returns and market shares at the individual firm level does not
generate a social optimum but may result in a disruption of the natural and social environment
even when there is perfect information about all consequences.

Social costs are by definition

borne by others since they are not paid for by the producing firm but rather are shifted externally.
From this perspective, Swaney [1989] stated that cost-shifting was nearly synonymous with social
costs: those who created the harmful consequences were not held responsible.

Swaney [1989]

further suggested that cost-shifting implied that the companies had an incentive to shift costs onto
others since the entities in market systems had great pressure to become competitive.

The cost-shifting incentive was attributed to the profit seeking principle and competitive
character of the market system. Neoclassical economics emphasized how the competitive market
could provide goods or services to consumers at the lowest possible price.
price only allowed the firm to realize just enough profit to stay in business.

This lowest possible
Under the pressure

of cutting cost or going-out of business, a systematic incentive induces the firms to avoid
individual monetary costs.

Companies were under more pressure to cut cost or shift social cost

to the society or ecosystem when the market was more competitive.

In the real world, costs were

cut wherever gains (avoided costs) exceeded the entrepreneurial effort expanded to achieve profit
maximization.
costs.

Avoiding individual firm’s costs did not necessarily mean the reduction of social

Society’s total costs may increase “as violators of ethical or legal rules find it worthwhile

to produce misinformation” [Swaney, 1987, p. 1760].

The pecuniary valuation under modem market systems told us that the “rational” manager or
entrepreneur would pursue the most cost-effective means to improve the bottom line profit.

If it

was cheaper for an individual entity to shift costs than to employ technology that was superior
from a social perspective, the rational profit-maximizing manager would choose the former.
Otherwise, he or she would be weeded from the ranks of managers by the forces of competition.
As a result, social costs became the direct result of incentives within the market system itself but
not the result of unfortunate and accidental side effects of economic activity.

Kapp’s social cost concept provides a methodological umbrella, under which the widest
range of unaccounted costs could be explored.
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Since global warming impacts every nation,

every person, and all species on earth, we have to evaluate a carbon trading system in
consideration of “social cost” and “cost-shifting”.

2.2.4. Valuation

Pecuniary evaluation was broadly used in the market economy as prices determined the
production and distribution of goods.

Historically, the contribution of ecosystems was largely

neglected in the pecuniary valuation process.

The analytical separation of market from

socio-ecosystem did not recognize ecosystems’ contributions to economic provisioning.

When

soil, wood, and other environmental products were abundant, they contributed the most to
economy, but their market value was small.
market value was high.

When environmental products were scarce, the

Odum [2000] argued that market price evaluation could not

appropriately assess environmental capital, its contributions, or its impacts.

The failure to recognize the value of ecosystem in the market economy was regarded as one
of the underlying reasons of environmental degradation. Ecological economists began developing
valuation methods to assign an economic value to the ecological system and its services to
describe the interdependency of human economies and natural ecosystems [Farber 2002, Turner
2003].

Neoclassical economists developed the contingent valuation method (CVM) to quantify the
value of ecosystem services which were not considered in the market.

The CVM method was

aimed to measure people’s willingness to pay (WTP) for an environmental benefit or their
willingness to accept (WTA) a change that was likely to reduce welfare.
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Variations include

avoided cost, replacement cost, factor income, travel cost, hedonic pricing, contingent valuation
etc [Farber, 2002]. One of the most important syntheses of existing studies was done by Costanza
et al. [1997].

They collected economic values of 17 ecosystem services from more than 100

studies, and calculated the total as the value for the entire biosphere on earth in terms of 1994 US
dollars.

Ackerman and Stanton [2008] estimated U.S. economic impacts from global warming

would be as high as 3.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Four global warming impacts

alone, including hurricane damage, real estate losses, energy costs, and water costs, would come
with a price tag of 1.8 percent of U.S. GDP, or almost $1.9 trillion annually (in 2008 dollars) by
2100.

The issues with CVM methods included relying on overly restrictive assumptions such as

individual utility maximization and having exogenous preference for ecological goods and
services.

These methods often produced poor descriptions of the environmental values people

actually held as well as of the process of preference formation [Spash, 1997, 2000].

Swaney [1987] proposed “co-evolutionary sustainability” as the principle to evaluate the
impact of development paths or technological applications on the ecosystem.

To achieve

co-evolutionary sustainability, the paths or applications that placed serious threats to long-run
compatibility and sustainability of socio-ecosystem evolution should be avoided.

To achieve co-evolutionary sustainability, Gregory Hayden [1991] suggested that valuation of
ecosystems had to be accomplished within a socio-ecosystem framework.

Hayden developed a

general instrumental methodology for determining value indicators to evaluate natural resources
and ecosystems.

The methodology was designed to conduct valuation of: (1) Norms and control

properties, (2) Biodiversity, (3) Ecodevelopment, (4) Restoration cost and (5) System restoration.
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Norms and control properties guided the development of the socio-ecosystem.

Hayden

[1982] discussed two norms—the one developed in the system and the one imposed on the system.
He proposed to use a Social Fabric Matrix to evaluate the effectiveness of the normalization
controls by measuring the system flows that resulted from those norms.

Regarding the carbon

dioxide emissions reduction, currently few normalization controls were implemented to reduce
carbon emissions because only a few people were aware of the existence and impact of global
warming and insufficient actions were undertaken.

A carbon trading system can be viewed as the

imposed norms to solve global warming.

According to Hayden [1991], biodiversity valuation provided information about the
inventory of different kinds of species.

This evaluation can be used for quantifying the impact

on biodiversity of global warming and the impact can be included in calculating the ecosystem
cost of global warming.

Ecodevelopment valuation integrated the social, ecological and economic concerns for
evaluating production projects.

Hayden [1991] used the Social Fabric Matrix data to determine a

normalized flow that maintained ecosystem sustainability. The normalized flow can be used to
determine the cap of carbon trading system.

According to Hayden [1991], restoration cost was “an operational action to convert the
ecosystem into a budget sufficient for restoration” [p. 932].

Consideration of restoration cost is

helpful to identify and include the indirect impact of global warming.
the current ecosystem to the sustainable stage should be recognized.

All the costs to restore

System Restoration valuation was used to evaluate the alternative restoration projects to
choose the optimal one. “The optimal restoration alternative is the one that generates flows to
return the ecosystem to its original purpose and structure without creating other adverse deliveries
outside the threshold level for the system” [Hayden, 1991, p. 933].

The optimal alternative also

needs to minimize the use of resources during the restoration process. Restoration valuation could
evaluate different paths to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions.

2.2.5. Property Right Regimes

An example of Hayden’s norms and control properties is the property right regimes.
Bromley [1992] argued that property was not an object but was a social relation that defined the
property holder with respect to benefit against all others.

While carbon emission was released to

the atmosphere, the current research discussed very little about the property regimes of the
atmosphere.

Emphases have to be made on the consequence of this social relation when

evaluating a carbon emission trading system.

Bromley [1991] argued for the use of the term

“property regimes” to define the triadic social relation that involved benefit streams, right holders,
and duty buyers.

He classified three general types of property regimes and open access as the

following:

Private property: Individual owner have right to conduct socially acceptable
uses, and have duty to avoid social unacceptable uses.

Non-owners have the

duty to refrain from preventing socially acceptable uses, and have a right to
expect that only socially acceptable uses will occur.
State property: Individuals have duty to observe use/access rules determined
by controlling/managing agency.

Agencies have right to determine use/access

rules.
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Common property:

The management group has right to

nonmembers, and nonmembers have duty to abide by exclusion.

exclude

Individual

members of the management group have both rights and duties with respect to
use rates and maintenance of the thing owned.
Open access (Nonproperty): No defined group of users or “owners” and
benefit stream is available to anyone.

Individuals have both privilege and no

right with respect to use rates and maintenance of the asset. [Bromley 1991, p.
31]
Swaney [2003] argued that there was conflation of open access and common property for
decades.

For example, Gordon [1959] treated the open access as common property in “The

Economic Theory of a Common Property Resources: The Fishery”. Hardin’s “The tragedy of the
Commons” [1968] perpetuated this confusion.

Hardin [1968] proposed two means to restrict access and consumption of the open-access
resources including privatization and regulation.

Government regulation proposed by Hardin

typically converted open-access (non-property) into public/state property or some mixed form of
public and private property [Cole, 2002].

After Hardin’s false dichotomy, Coase produced free

market environmentalism that suggested privatization as the solution to prevent resource
degradation.

Free market environmentalists believed that the market alone could solve the global

warming issue. We can view the design of carbon trading schemes as one of their experiments.
Different from Gordon, Hardin and free market environmentalists, Swaney favored common
property regimes to manage the open access resources.

He argued that the “open access” regime,

not the common property regime, leaded to environment degradation.
that private

property

regimes

were

Open-resources were mixing and mobile.

not

suitable

to

manage

Swaney further suggested
open-access

resources.

Since private property regimes only protected owners’
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right and refrained from non-owner’s access, the mixing and mobility characteristics made it
impractical to prevent the benefits or cost from spilling over to non-owners.

Swaney [2003] argued that capitalism broke down previously common property regimes (e.g.
lands owned by Indian tribes) to open access through commodification, then some open access
resources were converted to private property regimes. During this process, the resources were
overexploited and degraded without holding anyone accountable for the costs.

To manage the

open-access resources such as air and water effectively, Swaney [2003] proposed new co-managed
property relations as the solution.

Swaney’s “co-management” regimes solution incorporated private, state and common
property regimes to manage the current open-access resources.

In co-management regimes,

government still set the broad use rules on a regional or global scale, and the local community was
involved in the resources management.

Swaney’s solution corresponded to Kapp’s proposal at

the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1971.

Kapp [1971] proposed that

common or collective property rights should be used to manage natural resources such as air,
water, esthetic values etc.

This co-management approach could be used in the carbon trading

system since the atmosphere involved is open-access resource.

The community should be

involved actively in the process to determine the cap of the emission permits in a carbon trading
system.
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III. ANALYSIS
3.1.

Cap Determination

If the ultimate goal for adopting a trading system is to solve the climate change issue, the cap
has to be deliberately determined at the level where the ecosystem can sustain itself.

Without the

effective cap, no point exists to discuss other issues related to the adoption of the carbon trading
system.

To our knowledge, no research papers discussed the cap determination.

It was

assumed that the government could set the appropriate cap for carbon dioxide emissions reduction.

The appropriate cap depends on the analytical framework that we adopt and the sort of
valuation applied in the socio-ecosystem.

The value indicators developed by Hayden [1991]

could be used to value the socioecosystem.

The value technique included the means to conduct

valuation of: (1) nonns and control properties, (2) biodiversity, (3) ecodevelopment, (4)
restoration cost and (5) system restoration.

Norms and control properties valuation could be used

to assess the current norms and controls to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.

Understanding the

current system can help to establish an appropriate cap.

Biodiversity and Restoration valuation

were important means to evaluate the ecosystem value.

Biodiversity evaluation could be used

for quantifying global warming’s impact on biodiversity.

The quantified impact could be

included into the calculation of the ecosystem cost of global warming.

Considering restoration

cost is helpful to identify and calculate the indirect impact of global warming.
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System

restoration valuation includes all the costs to restore the current ecosystem to the sustainable stage.
It can help define the ultimate goal for carbon dioxide emissions reduction.

3.2.

Trading Schemes Selection

Among the three trading schemes (absolute cap-and-trade system, relative cap-and-trade
system and the combination of absolute and relative system), this thesis concludes that the
absolute cap-and-trade system is the best system to effectively reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
In the absolute cap-and-trade system, polluters must own the emitting permits to gain the right to
produce carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere in a given time frame.

Also, there is a

guarantee for reducing total carbon emissions to a certain level because of the established cap.

In the absolute cap-and-trade system, since the number of total available permits is usually
less than the current amount of carbon dioxide emission, the demand for buying the permits is
generated.

Generally, the polluter can choose between holding more permits or reducing the

emissions. Theoretically, if we adopt marginal analysis, at the equilibrium of the free trading
market mechanism, the price of the permit equals the cost of reducing one more unit of pollution.
The uniform market price has all the polluters faced with an equal marginal cost of pollution.
Firms with higher marginal pollution reduction cost choose not to decrease emission but to buy
permits in the trading market.

If a firm’s marginal cost to reduce emissions is lower than the

permit price, it will choose to decrease emission release and sell the permits in the carbon trading
markets to make a profit.

Therefore, the minimized national abatement costs can be achieved

while limiting the national emissions at the same time.
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In the relative cap-and-trade system, the cap is not absolute. It means the maximum
emissions are not fixed but the emission per certain level of activity such as carbon dioxide
emissions per unit of steel production are fixed per the requirement of legislation or domestic
standards.
system.

A pre-determined relative standard is established for the used level of activity in the
The number of the permit units is calculated by multiplying the size of the activity with

the difference between the actual emissions per unit of activity and the relative standard.

The

relative cap-and-trade system does not guarantee to reduce carbon emissions to a certain level.

If we look through the prism of Neoinstitutional analysis and step from the marginalist
framework, the major issue is to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions, to control global warming,
and to sustain ecosystem stability.

Therefore, although the relative cap-and-trade system could

increase companies’ competitiveness at the international level, this argument is not relevant for the
problem of global warming as it focuses only on the firm or the nation’s individual cost.

The

absolute cap-and-trading would address better the Neoinstitutional concerns of social cost of
carbon emissions.

3.3.

Permits Allocation

Although the grandfathering method was widely adopted in the world, this thesis concludes
that the auction method is superior over the grandfathering method for allocating emitting permits.
Both auction and grandfathering have the same result on reducing emissions because the cap is the
same under the two allocation methods.

The difference is the revenue flow.

the citizens receive the revenues in the auction method.

The government or

Under grandfathering, the previously

socially inefficient companies (those highly polluting) obtained a higher share of the total permits
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and had more windfall profits.

The companies who shifted social cost were rewarded after

transferring cost to the community and environment.

Under the auction method, the polluting entities account for the impact on the community
and nature through purchasing the permits for carbon dioxide emissions.
entity in the market system pay for the social cost.

This method makes the

By incorporating the social cost into their

production cost and cause the cost-shifting impracticable, the entity has the incentive to develop
advanced technology to decrease carbon dioxide emissions, e.g., the use of the renewable energy
sources instead of fossil fuels.

In the auction system, the socially efficient and less polluting entities are rewarded since they
only need purchase fewer permits.
interested in the permits.

It provides an equal opportunity for any party who is

In the grandfathering method, only the polluting companies have the

privilege to receive those free emitting permits. Auction system can also serve as a tool for the
government to manage the trading market.

In the sulfur dioxide trading market in the United

States, the government used the auction method as a tool to send a price signal to the market
[Matsuo, 1998].

Although the proponents of the grandfathering allocation method claim that polluting
companies can develop the technology to reduce their emissions and avoid increasing their
product price substantially through using the windfall profits, current research does not support
such claims [Sijm, 2005].

The free allocation of emitting permits did not bring customers

stabilized electricity prices in Germany and the Netherlands when grandfathering was used in the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005.
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Sijm et al. [2005] examined the

electricity price in Germany and Netherlands and found that the electricity prices increased 50% to
60% and the electricity industry passed about 60% to 120% of the carbon costs to their customers
in 2005.

Their data showed that electricity companies passed through the cost although they

received windfall profits.

The grandfathering allocation system only brought substantial profit to

the carbon-dioxide emitters and their shareholders who usually belong to the wealthier classes in
those countries.

The combination of auction and grandfathering is another option.

It allows a portion of the

emission permits to be auctioned by the government and the rest to be allocated among the
polluters.

Ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states established the Regional Greenhouse Gas

Initiative (RGGI) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.

RGGI committed to

auction the majority of its Carbon Dioxide permits through quarterly auctions.

It conducted its

first Carbon Dioxide auction in Oct. 2008. [RGGI, 2008]

Another argument for the auction method is related to the property right issue.

This thesis

agrees with Barnes’ view that the atmosphere is a common property since every person is entitled
to inhale oxygen and exhale carbon dioxide.

Since the atmosphere is a common property to

everyone and everyone is equal in the world, every person should have an equal share of the
atmosphere.

Those companies which produce carbon dioxide have to pay a price to those who

own the property, i.e., every person in the world or within the nation. The auction method
recognizes everyone’s property right.

In the grandfathering method, only the users (the polluting

company), not the owners of the atmosphere are rewarded because only the polluting companies
can receive the free but valuable emitting permits.
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The choice of an allocation method is made through the negotiation and bargaining power
among different parties including large companies and citizens. The popularity of the grandfather
allocation shows that large companies used their lobbying power to influence politicians to adopt
policies that benefited themselves.

It is important for citizens to recognize the difference

between auctioning and grandfathering permits and take actions to inform their representatives in
Congress which one is better for them.

3.4.

Revenue Distribution

Given that one can conclude the superiority of the auction allocation method in the carbon
trading system, the next issue concerns the entitlement and allocation of the auction revenues.
This thesis supports Barnes’s Sky Trust proposal and Swaney’s co-management approach.
Barnes’s Sky Trust proposal not only recognizes every person’s equal ownership of the
atmosphere but awards those owners in the economic system by distributing equal dividends to
every person.

Another benefit of the establishment of the Sky Trust is to decrease the burden of

the lower income households who suffer from adopting a carbon trading system.

The literature

review section discussed the case studies of the distribution effect of the Sky Trust in China, the
United States and Hungary.

All the cases showed that lower income households benefited from

the carbon trading system if a Sky Trust was adopted.

Evidence showed that the distribution

income from a Sky Trust benefited low income individuals and increased social equality.

Meanwhile, we have to acknowledge that the ultimate goal for adopting the trading system is
not to realize social equality.

The objective is to resolve the climate change issue and to use the

air resources in a sustainable way.

As Hayden and Swaney emphasized, social arrangements and
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environmental conditions are connected.

In the process to achieve carbon emissions reduction,

we can also use the appropriate distribution method to realize social equality.

The two goals are

inter-related.

Barnes’s Sky Trust distribution reflected the common property regimes character of the air.
In Swaney’s view, the co-management approach should be applied to manage those open-access
resources such as air and water.
government and local community.

This approach emphasized the collaboration between
The government sets the broad use rules on the regional or

global scale, and the local community is responsible for resources management.

If local

communities have more knowledge about nearby local resources than the national government,
they should not be isolated from the resource management.

Compared to Barnes’s Sky Trust,

Swaney’s co-management approach requires the local community (the citizens) to play an active
role in managing the air rather than only receiving the revenue from the government.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Reducing carbon dioxide emissions is an urgent issue for any country in the world because of
the severe impact of global climate change.
the carbon dioxide emissions.

An absolute cap-and-trade system will help reduce

The cap of the trading system has to be determined at a level

estimated through a socio-ecological framework of valuation that goes beyond individual cost, and
conceptualizes social cost.

The trading system provides companies the choice to either purchase additional permits to
release carbon dioxide or develop advanced technologies to reduce carbon emissions through
comparing the price of the emission permits and the cost to implement advanced technologies.
Auction allocation avoids the wind fall profits for polluting companies by imposing a fee on
polluting companies.
carbon dioxide.

It requires the market system to account for the social cost of emitting

The revenues generated through auctions also provide the opportunity for the

owners of the atmosphere to benefit from their ownership.

Grandfathering emitting permits

benefit only the polluting companies and their shareholders.

This does not resolve the

environmental social cost problem, and rewards cost-shifting behavior.

Grandfathering not only

encourages continuing social cost shift in the future but also increases the social inequality by only
rewarding the companies who already have privileges to produce carbon dioxide to the
atmosphere.

Barnes’s Sky Trust is preferable for distributing auction revenue from the sale of the emitting
permits.

The equal distribution income from a Sky Trust can ease the burden on lower income

households who suffer from increasing living costs after adopting the carbon trading system.
One must recognize that the cost-benefit analysis of Barnes’ Sky Trust only focuses on
household’s increased living expense because of higher fossil fuels price and increased income
through receiving distributions from the Sky Trust.
can’t be measured by monetary valuation alone.

Barnes failed to consider the factors that

For example, health problems can be measured

by the money spent on treatment, lost income, etc. but emotional and ecological consequences
cannot be offset entirely by money income.

No meaningful monetary compensation exists for a

destroyed ecosystem that can’t be repaired. To understand the impact of a Sky Trust, a more
comprehensive evaluation should be conducted in the future.

In addition to Barnes’s Sky Trust, Swaney’s co-management approach should be applied to
manage the atmosphere.

Local communities should take an active role in reducing carbon

emissions to sustain the ecosystem along with the government.

During the United States 2008 presidential campaign, both candidates, Senator John McCain
and Barack Obama, supported the establishment of a carbon trading system to solve the global
warming issue.
emitting permits.

The major difference between them was the choice of methods for allocating
Senator McCain favored grandfathering the permits and conducting the

auctions gradually over time.

Senator Obama argued that the public owned the sky and proposed

to auction all the permits.

Senator Obama also proposed to invest the auction revenue to

renewable energy fields to realize the transition to a green economy.
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The cap under Senator

Obama’s plan was to reduce the carbon emissions to 80 percent below the levels in 1990 by 2050.
In support of the analysis conducted above, this thesis advocates Senator Obama’s proposal over
Senator McCain’s.

We must acknowledge that the establishment of an appropriate cap is built on the base of
recognizing the value of the socio-ecosystem.

Future research needs to quantify reasonably the

socio-ecosystem value by using Hayden’s [1991] value indicators.

During the process to

establish the appropriate cap for the trading system and managing auction revenues, the
government, local community and citizens should be involved actively and worked cooperatively.
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